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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
By A. M. TOLLEFSON*
I. INTRODUCTORY
T HE purpose of this article is to examine the attitude of the
federal courts toward the findings and decisions of the in-
terstate commerce commission. It is the purpose to show in which
cases the federal courts will review such decisions and in which
cases and to what extent they are conclusive. But in order proper-
ly to understand the relationship between the commission and the
courts, and the weight that the latter will give to the decisions
of the former, it is necessary to know why the commission w%-as
created, what its duties are, and to some extent, how it is organ-
ized, and how it reaches its decisions. Consequently, as prelimi-
nary to the consideration of judicial review of its decisions, it is
advantageous briefly to outline some of the main facts concern-
ing the creation, organization, activities, and procedure of the
commission.
II. CREATION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
REASONS FOR ITS CREATION AND STATUTES CONFERRING
DUTIES AND POWERS UPON THE COMM!rSSION
As soon as it was evident to the public that the railroads could
furnish a valuable means of transportation there came a demand
for additional railroad mileage. Consequently, during the early
period of railroad development in the United States, public at-
tention was directed toward rapid construction, and the national
government as well as the several states directed their energy to
*Professor of Law, Drake University Law School, Des Moines, Iowa.
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the granting of aid and assistance rather than toward regulation
and control. The result was that a large number of evils arose
which demanded governmental or, to be more specific, legislative
attention. The chief evils probably were the loss of public money
invested in railroads and discrimination in behalf of favored
shippers and localities. Such discrimination consisted in giving
special rates, rebates, drawbacks, underbilling, and reduced classi-
fication. Furthermore, without the violation of any law, rates
could be changed at will and without notice. The privilege of the
railroad to grant free transportation was sometimes abused and
the right of the individual shareholder, as well as the right of
the public, was at times not given due attention. In addition, as
could be expected from the new and immense undertaking of the
railroads, accidents were numerous and the loss of lives and limbs
heavy.
Since these evils, or at least some of them, had been preva-
lent in a greater or less degree for nearly a generation prior to
1870, it was to be expected that there would arise a demand for
governmental regulation. Such regulation was demanded both
from thie national government and from the several states, and
the latter preceded the former in heeding the demand.
It is interesting to note that the earliest form of state regulation
consisted in the creation of state commissions, the purpose of
which was chiefly to recommend measures to reduce the number
of accidents. Such commissions were established in New Hamp-
shire in 1844, in Connecticut in 1853, in Vermont in 1855. and in
Maine in 1858. The commission established in Rhode Island in
1839 had for its purpose the additional function of reporting "the
state, condition, and proceedings of the several railroad com-
panies, so far as the public interest" might require the same.
The Massachusetts railroad commission, created in 1869. had still
broader powers and marks the first outstanding step in state con-
trol and regulation of railroads. It was authorized to supervise
and examine all railroads in the state with reference to the se-
curity and accommodation of the public and the compliance of the
corporations with the provisions of their charters and the laws
of the state.'
'The Massachusetts Railroad Commission was to investigate complaints
against railroads made by town or city authorities and under certain con-
ditions, those made by voters as to the condition and operation of any
railroad, any part of whose location was within the limits of such city
or town. The commission was further authorized to serve notice upon
railroad corporations of their failure to comply with the terms of their
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Several of the Eastern states followed the lead of Massachu-
setts and established commissions with similar powers. For the
enforcement of the commission's decisions recourse was had al-
most exclusively to public opinion enlightened by extensive pub-
licity. The Western and Southern states went further and passed
maximum rate laws in the seventies and entrusted their commis-
sions with power to issue and enforce their orders by legal proc-
esses.
2
It soon became evident, however, that state regulation alone
was inadequate and that national legislation was necessary to
abolish several unfair practices still prevailing. Several bills to
regulate railroads engaged in interstate commerce were introduced
in Congress from 1868 on but they all failed to pass either house
'until 1874,1 when the House of Representatives passed a bill
aiming at rate regulation, and in 1878 one which became to a
large extent the pattern of the interstate commerce act. Although
the bill of 1878 did not provide for the establishment of a com-
mission it proposed a remedy through the courts after a dear
legal definition of abuses. In 1885 the Senate selected a com-
mittee of five senators to investigate and report upon the sub-
ject of interstate transportation. The committee accompanied
its report with a bill which provided for a permanent administra-
tive commission to make the suggested statutory regulation of
interstate commerce effective. As to the practice of pooling, the
House desired to make all traffic agreements illegal while the
Senate desired to leave that matter largely to the control of the
commission.4
The houses of Congress adjusted their differences and on
February 4, 1887, passed the act to regulate commerce, which act
became effective April fifth of the same year.- This act became
the first of a long series of national statutes regulating railways
and other public service corporations. The purpose of these
charters or the laws of the -commonwealth. It was to serve notice of
repairs upon the road, changes in rates, additions to rolling stock, etc.,
deemed necessary by the commissioners to promote the public security,
convenience, and accommodation, and finally to investigate accidents result-
ing in injury or loss of life. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1869, pp. 99-103.
Bernhardt, The Interstate Commerce Commission, Institute for Govern-
ment Research, No. 18, p. 3.2Bernhardt, I. C. C. pp. 3-4.3For a list and discussion of bills and resolutions introduced see Briggs,
Federal Regulation of Interstate Commerce, 1862-1913, and Haney, Con-
gressional History of Railways.4Bernhardt, I. C. C., pp. 4-6.
-24 Stat. at L. 379.
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statutes is chiefly to prevent excessive charges, discriminations,
and other unfair practices. The law established rules and prin-
ciples which these corporations, engaging in interstate commerce,
must observe. The act put into effect the wishes of the House
of Representatives by the prohibition of pooling, and by incor-
porating the long-and-short-haul clause which prohibited the
charging of a higher rate for a short haul than for a long one
in the same direction "under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions." The wishes of the Senate were enacted into law
by the creation of the interstate commerce commission to adnin-
ister the restrictions and enforce obedience. The chief purpose
of the commission was to bring into existence a body which would
be better fitted than the courts to decide whether rates or rules
published by a carrier'were unreasonable or unjustly discrimina-
tory and to secure and preserve uniformity in rates, rules, and
other practices.6
Partly because of the recommendations of the commission,
Co'ngress amended the act to regulate commerce on March 2,
1889.7 The amendment, among other things, provided a remedy
by mandamus in case of denial of equal facilities to shippers. At-
tempts by shippers to obtain lower rates by means of false billing
and other fraudulent devices were made criminal offenses. The
act required publication of joint tariffs and notification of changes.
Violation of the provisions of the act prohibiting the giving of
rebates and discriminations by the carriers was made punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both instead of by fine only. The
taking of testimony by deposition was authorized by an act of
February 10, 1891.8
In 1893 the first of a series of laws was passed which con-
ferred upon the commission jurisdiction in matters of safety and
the prevention of accidentsY
6Section eleven of the act to regulate commerce established the inter-
state commerce commission and provided that the commission should con-
sist of five members, not more than three of whom were to be of the
same political party, appointed by the president with the concurrence of
the senate, for six year terms. Section 21 of the act directed the com-
mission to report to Congress recommendations as to additional legislation
on the regulation of interstate commerce as the commission might deem
necessary. Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922)
259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 447, 66 L. Ed. 943. For a summary of the
provisions of the act of 1887 to regulate commerce, see Ripley, Railroads,
Ratis, and Regulations, p. 452. and Johnson & Van Metre, Principles of
Railroad Transportation, p. 495.
725 Stat. at L. 832.
826 Stat. at L. 743.
9Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. at L. 531. The act, among other things,
pertained to drawbars, grab-irons or hand holds, driving wheel brakes,
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The Elkins amendment was passed in 190310 and the Hepburn
bill in 1906.11 The latter of those acts remedied many of the
shortcomings of the act of 1887. The membership of the commis-
sion was increased from five to seven and the term of office from
six to seven years. The commission was given jurisdiction over
express and sleeping car companies and over pipe lines except
those used for transportation of water or gas.'2
"Uilder the act of 1887 the commission claimed the power not
only to investigate problems relating to freight rates but upon
the train brake system, and automatic couplers, and made it the duty of
the commission to secure adherence to the law and the reasonable rules of
the commission which might be published along these lines.
On February 11, 1893, (27 Stat. at K 443) it was enacted not only
that no one should be excused from attending and testifying before the
commission but also that no one should be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any affair concerning
which he was compelled to testify or produce evidence. Ten years later,
on February 11, 1903, the so-called expediting act (32 Stat. at L. 823)
was passed which provided that in any suit in equity brought in any
circuit court of the United States under the interstate commerce act
(the act to regulate commerce as amended by a number of later acts)
the attorney-general might file with a clerk of court a certificate stating
that in his opinion the case was of general public importance, whereupon
the case was to be given precedence and expedited and assigned for hear-
ing before at least three federal judges. Appeal from the decision of
the circuit court was to be made only to the Supreme Court and within
sixty days -of the-decree-of the circuit court. The purpose of this act
was to avoid long delays in the courts, a condition that had been a
serious "drawback to efficient enforcement of the act of 1887.
10Act of February 19, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 847. The provisions of
the Elkins amendment have been summarized as follows:
The railroad 'corporation itself, not as heretofore its officers and
agents merely, -was made subject to prosecution and penalty.
The penalty of imprisonment for non-adherence to the published tariff
(as in amendment of 1889) was removed. It was expected that in this
way witnesses would not be so reluctant to testify to the activites of asso-
ciates, since the only penalty was a fine which could fall upon the cor-
poration rather than the individual.
Any departure from the published tariff was made a misdemeanor
so that proof of preferential treatment of shippers was no longer re-
quired.Shippers oi any other interested parties were made liable to prose-
cution for receiving rebates as well as carriers for granting them.
Injun'ctions could be issued by any federal judge whenever the com-
mission had reasonable ground for belief that any common carrier was
not conforming to the published tariff or committing any discrimination
forbidden by law. See: Ripley, Railroads, Rates & Regulations 493-4.
Bernhardt, I. C. C., p. 21.
"Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. at 1- 584.
X2The term railroad was broadened to include switches, spurs, tracks,
and terminal facilities, and the term transportation was broadened to in-
chide "cafs ind 6ther vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of
shipmehf or cairiage irrespective of ownership or of any contract, ex-
pressed oi- inplied, for the use thereof, and all services in connection with
the receipt, delivery, elevation and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrig-
eration or icing, storage or handling of property transported." Part rail
and part water transportation was also included.
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complaint of current abuses to prescribe remedy for existing
evils. This power claimed by the commission was not seriously
questioned until in 1896 when the case of Cincinnati, N. 0. &
T. P. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission1 came before the
Supreme Court. That court said that it was unable to find any
provision of the act that expressly or by necessary implication
conferred such a power. Other cases were decided to the same
effect and finally in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cinchi-
nati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry.14 the Supreme Court decided that the
commission had no power to "prescribe a rate for the future,
although its right to pass upon the reasonableness or unreason-
ableness of a rate already paid and of which complaint is made
is unquestioned."
These decisions dealt heavy blows to the alleged powers of the
commission over rates, and about the only measure still available
to it was to declare illegal one rate after another and thus induce
the railroads to establish reasonable rates."1 By the Hepburn act
of 190610 the commission was authorized after complaint and upon
hearing to fix reasonable maximum rates or charges, regulations,
or practices to be subsequently observed by the carriers. The
Senate eliminated from the bill the power to pass upon the reason-
ablen'ess of a proposed schedule of rates prior to its taking effect.
Under this amendment also, the commission could order an ap-
portionment of joint rates when the carriers were unable to agree
upon a division. It could establish through-rates and fix reason-
able charges for services or instrumentalities rendered or provided
by the shippers. Furthermore, the orders of the commission were
effective from the date of promulgation, and until reversed or set
aside and a penalty was provided for violation."
13(1896) 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935. Sometimes
referred to as the Social Circle Case.
14(1897) 167 U. S. 479, 17 Sup. Ct. 896, 42 L. Ed. 243. Sometimes
referred to as the Maximum Freight Rate case.
IsThe industrial commission reported (Report of Industrial Com-
mission XIX, p. 428) that the denial of the right, not only to pass upon
the reasonableness of a particular rate, but to prescribe what rate should
supersede it, meant the abolition of all control whatever.
1634 Stat. at L. 584.
17AII orders of the commission except for money payments were to
take effect within such reasonable time, not less than thirty days, as it
might prescribe, and were to remain effective for two years, unless sus-
pended, modified or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction or by
the commission. The circuit courts were authorized by suit to enjoin, set
aside, annul, or suspend orders or requirements of the commission, pro-
vided that five days notice be given the commission to enable it to prepare
a protest and a hearing should be had before three federal justices. A
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On June 18, 1910, the Mann-Elkins act was passed ' which
enlarged the jurisdiction of the commission to include interstate
wire or wireless telegraph, telephone, and cable companies. The
commission was given power to suspend rates pending examination
as to their reasonableness. The long-and-short-haul clause of the
act of 1887 was amended by eliminating the words "under sub-
stantially similar circumstances and conditions" and made hear-
ing and approval by the commission necessary before lower
charges could be established to longer distance points." The
commission was furthermore authorized to institute proceedings
and to make and enforce orders based thereon as in cases insti-
tuted on complaint by other parties. The commission was atu-
thorized where necessary, after due hearing, to order such
through-routes as it might deem desirable and to prescribe joint
rates therefor. By the Act of March 1, 1913,20 the commission
penalty of five thousand dollars per day, after the expiration of thirty
days was fixed for each day's violation of the commission's order.
Before the act of 1887 was amended as above, one of the greatest
difficulties in the administration of the act was the inadequate procedure
prescribed by the act. The commission's order was not law and was bind-
ing on no one until appealed to and affirmed by the courts. Then there
was the possibility of appeal to the Supreme Court. The average dura-
tion of the appealed cases was four years, resulting in an enormous ex-
pense and a costly delay. Ripley, Railroads, Rates & Regulations 462.
1836 Stat. at L. 539.
'
0 The long-and-short-haul clause was further amended by prohibit-
ing a greater compensaion for a through-haul than the total of the interme-
diate rates and by providing that no railroad could increase a rate which
it had reduced at competitive points in competition with a water route
unless the commission decided after hearing that reasons other than water
competition demanded the increase.
2037 Stat. at L. 701.
By the Clayton Act of October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 730, the com-
mission was authorized to enforce certain provisions of the act which
aimed at restraints and monopolies in so far as the law applied to car-
riers subject to the interstate commerce act. Furthermore, by a series of
additional laws pertaining to the safety of passengers and of the employers
of the common carriers, Congress gave extensive powers to the commis-
sion regarding the administration of the laws. These acts, among other
things, provided for publicity, for numerous inspections and reports, as
well as for many specific measures for safety; all of which extended the
jurisdiction of the commission. See:
Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. at L. 531; Act of March 3, 1901, 31
Stat. at L 1446; Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 943; Toint resolu-
tion of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 838; Act of March 4. 190 . 34 Stat. at
L. 1416; Act of May 27, 1908, 35 Stat. at L. 317, 325; Act of May 30. 1908,
35 Stat at L. 476; Act of May 30, 1908, 35 Stat. at L. 555; Act of March
4, 1909, 35 Stat. at L. 1088, 1159; Act of April 14, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 298;
Act of May 6, 1910, 36 Stat. at L. 350; Act of February 17, 1911, 36 Stat.
at L. 913; Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. at L 1192.
With the entrance of the United States in the World War new prob-
lems confronted the commission. By the act of August 9, 1917, 40 Stat.
at L. 270, the membership of the commission was increased from seven to
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was directed to appraise the property of all common carriers sub-
ject to the act to regulate commerce.
The transportation act of 192021 authorized the commission
to prescribe minimum as well as maximum rates, but a period of
150 days was fixed as the maximum time during which the com-
mission could suspend the operation of proposed schedules.2 2 The
nine, and it was authorized to branch into as many divisions as might be
necessary with the senior in service in each division acting as chairman.
Authority was conferred upon each division to "hear and determine,
order, certify, report, or otherwise act as to any of the work, business,
or functions so assigned or referred to it for action of the commission."
The act provided that "in all proceedings before any such division relating
to the reasonableness of rates or to alleged discriminations not less
than three members should participate in the consideration and decision
and in all proceedings relating to the valuation of railway property not
less than five members should participate. Section four of this act amended
section five of the interstate commerce act by adding the provision that
until January 1, 1920, no increased rate, fare, or classification should be
filed except after approval thereof had been secured from the commission,
which body could, in its discretion, grant such approval without formal
hearing.
In accordance with a law of Congress, (Act of August 29, 1916, 39
Stat. at L. 645; see also Act of August 10, 1917, 40 Stat. at L. 272) Presi-
dent Wilson by proclamation of December 26, 1917 assumed operation and
control of the railroads of the country. Such operation and control
were vested in a director-general of railroads, and by an act of March 21,
1918, 40 Stat. at L. 451, the powers of the commission under the new
management were defined. The commission was to assist the President
and the director-general in the operation and control of the railroads and
as such were given a number of functions in connection therewith. On
the other hand, as assistants to the president and to the director, the author-
ity of the commission was materially limited in several respects especially
as to rates.
By the transportation act of February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 456,
Congress made provisions for the return of the railroads to the owners
and laid down regulations for the future. By terminating the powers of
the president and director, the powers of the commission were restored
as before the war, and in addition new duties were conferred upon it,
especially as to the liquidation of governmental operation, and those relat-
ing to the control of the carriers after return to the owners. As to the
former, the commission, among other things, was directed to ascertain the
deficits of the railroads during the period of governmental control and to
certify the amounts to the secretary of the treasury for reimbursements.
As to the latter, the outstanding thing was the constructive attitude taken
toward the carriers, especially in that the commission was to prescribe
such rates as would yield a fair return on the capital invested. The com-
mission was also given extensive powers to supervise the financial ope-
rations of the carriers as they were prohibited from issuing securities or
from assuming obligations or liabilities in respect to securities of others
except after approval of the commission.21Act of February 28, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 456.
221f the proceedings upon suspension were not concluded within that
time, the proposed schedule was to go into effect, but the commission could
require the carriers to keep detailed accounts of all amounts received by
reason of increases in such rates and charges, and if the decision of the
commission were adverse, it could require the carrier or carriers to refund
with interest such portions of increased rates or charges as by its decision
should be found unjustified.
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commission was also in several respects given a wider jurisdiction
over common carriers than it had before the war, and its mem-
bership was increased to eleven.23
III. ORGANIZATION OF THE COT-1MI1SSION
The interstate commerce commission has a staff of several
hundred persons including clerks, attorneys, examiners, statis-
ticians, investigators, and technical experts. As to units of or-
ganization, the personnel of the commission proper consists of
the eleven commissioners, the secretary to the commission, and a
small number of clerks. The members of the commission are
grouped into five divisions. There are thirteen bureaus, each
with a single head who reports to a commissioner, who in turn can
bring matters to a division, or, if need be, to the entire commis-
sion for determination. The thirteen bureaus are those of ad-
ministration, formal cases, informal cases, traffic, inquiry, law,
safety, locomotive inspection, service, finance, accounts, statistics,
and valuation. Each of these bureaus is divided into a number of
sections. A board of referees, composed of chiefs of various
sections, passes upon minor matters of an administrative nature,
as to which the commission's policy has been settled by previous
rulings.2
4
IV. PROCEDURE BEFORE THE COMMISSION
(a) lit General. The rules regarding who may start proceed-
ings before the commission are very liberal as the initiative can
be taken by the commission itself, by one or several shippers, or
by another party or parties, having a proper interest in the case.
23The members of the commission were grouped into five divisions,
numbered one to five, and each division was to consist of three members
except division four which was composed of four members. Each division
was given power to act in a matter that duly came before it but reservation
was made- for consideration and disposition by the full commission of
all general investigations and of applications for rehearing, reargument.
and other consideration, and of certain other cases specifically enumerated.
As to further powers of the interstate commerce commission, see 'Mer-
chant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 988, sec. 8 & 28; Act of
June 5, 1920, 41 Stat. at L. 946; Act of February 26, 1921, 41 Stat. at
L 1145; Act of March 4, 1921, 41 Stat. at L. 1444; Act of June 10, 1921,
42 Stat. at L. 27.
See also the Interstate Commerce Act, including text or related sec-
tions of other- acts, published by the interstate commerce commission,
revised to August 1, 1923, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923.24For further data as to the organization of the commission, see
Bernhardt, I. C. C., ch. 3.
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It is the duty of the bureau of administration, headed by the
secretary of the commission, among other things, to kee l) records
of complaints and all ensuing proceedings and actions. This bu-
reau issues receipts for papers received, and answers, files, and
indexes the general correspondence. In practice, however, much
of the general correspondence is answered by the bureau of in-
formal cases with the signature or authorized signature of the
secretary of the commission. The bureau of administration also
has for its functions the recording of orders and minutes and the
filing and docketing of complaints, answers, orders, and other
papers, as well as the serving of petitions and orders upon par-
lies to formal proceedings.2 '
(b) As to Informal Proceedings. '[he bureau of informal
cases disposes of a large volume of business that is handled with-
out instituting formal proceedings. This bureau was established
to centralize and standardize the treatment of the many and varied
intricate problems submitted to the commission, to provide ade-
quate means of the settlement of claims of shippers against car-
riers and finally, to dispose of informal complaints before they
developed into formal ones, especially in cases where the unrea-
sonableness of the rates, practice, or regulation was adnitted by
the carrier concerned. In order to carry out these and other funtc-
tions, this bureau devotes its attention largely to general corre-
spondence, inquiries, and to informal complaints, and to these
and other claims that may find their way to the special (locket as
distinguished from the formal docket of the commission. The
decisions or rulings of the bureau of informal cases, as approved.
amended, or adopted by the commission, are published in its
bulletin of conference rulings, at least insofar as they involve an
interpretation of law or rules of the commission. "6
(c) As to Formal Cases. The bureau of the formal cases
handles all those instituted by formal complaints whether insti-
tuted by the commission on its own motion or by shippers or
others. Because of the many and varied functions of the com-
mission and of the large number of cases on the formal docket."
2 Bernhardt, I. C. C., pp. 110-111.2 The number of informal complaints received by the bureau of in-
formal cases during the year ending October 31, 1921, were 7811, while
2350 special docket applications were filed for authority to refund amounts
collected under published rates, admitted by the carriers involved or by
the director-general of the railroads to have been unreasonable. Orders
authorizing refunds were entered in 1289 cases, while 211 cases were dis-
posed of without orders. Bernhardt, I. C. C.. p. 113.2TThe following table from Bernhardt. I. C. C.. p. 111, shows the
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it has for many years been impossible for the commissioners per-
sonally to take testimony in the great majority of cases coming
before the commission. To meet this situation the Hepburn act
authorized the appointment of special examiners. These exami-
ners hear cases and take testimony, generally in the field, and then
prepare a report in each case, which is submitted to the parties
concerned for any statement of exceptions which they may wish
to file. The record of the hearings, the report of the examiner
in the case, and the statements filed by the party against whom
action has been taken, are laid before the board of review, which
consists of members selected from the staff of examiners. The
board of review then prepares the final report of the bureau of
formal cases and recommends to the commission what action, in
its judgment, should be taken and in due course the commission
will pass upon the case and render its decision or issue its order.s
One of the thirteen bureaus, the bureau of law, represents the
commission in all court proceedings in which the latter is a party.2-
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DECISIONS BY THE COURTS, AS TO THE
RELATION BETWEEN THE COURTS AND THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE COMIfMISSION; WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
JURISDICTION AND TO QUESTIONS THAT 'MUST BE CoxsiD-
ERED BY THE COM!MISSION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
(a) Provisions of the Act Applicable. Before taking up the
problem as to the weight generally given by the courts to the
findings and orders of the interstate commerce commission, we
shall examine some of the questions that the courts will not con-
sider until they have been passed upon by the commission. In
other words we shall consider the questions and the nature of the
questions which must be passed upon by the commission in the
first instance.
status of the formal case docket as of October 31 for four consecutive
years: 1918 1919 1920 1921
Formal complaints filed ..................... 456 838 1,040 1,487
Cases at issue but not set for hearing ........ 21 54 146 201
Cases set for hearing but not heard .......... 142 184 92 205
Cases heard but not fully submitted .......... 87 234 505 714
Cases submitted ............................ 386 274 385 445
Cases disposed of .......................... 653 598 620 1,021
-SBernhardt, I. C. C., pp. 111-112.29This bureau also prepares briefs and memoranda on questions of
law whenever required, participates to some extent in special inquiries
prosecuted by the commission, and supervises and co-ordinates the work
of the attorneys engaged in other bureaus of the commission.
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In this connection there are chiefly two provisions of the
interstate commerce act which are pertinent. Section nine pro-
vides that any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any
common carrier, subject to the provisions of the act, may either
make complaint to the commission, or may bring suit for the re-
covery of the damages for which such carrier may be liable, in
any district or circuit court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction. But such person or persons shall not have the right
to pursue both such remedies and must elect which one he or they
will adopt.3 0 Section twenty-two of the Interstate Commerce Act
provides that nothing contained in the act shall abridge or alter
the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but that
the provisions of the act are in addition to such remedies. The




(b) Questions of Rates and Discriminations. In construing
these sections as to which questions must be considered by the
commission before the courts will act, and as to the nature of such
questions, the Supreme Court has held that initial action must
be had before the commission in an action to obtain relief from an
alleged unreasonable freight rate. This is especially true where
such rate has been filed with the commission and promulgated as
provided by the act, and has been the rate which it was the duty
of the carrier to enforce.3 2 As to the provisions of section nine
of the act referred to, the court held that the right of an individual
originally to maintain actions in the courts to obtain pecuniary
redress for violations of the act must be confined to such wrongs
as can, consistently with the context of the act, be redressed with-
out previous action by the commission. The court also stated that
the provisions of section twenty-two referred to cannot be con-
strued as continuing in shippers a common-law right, the con-
tinued existence of which would be absolutely inconsistent with
the provisions of the statute.3
The cases dealing with rates and the reasonableness of these
show that whenever a rate, rule, or practice is attacked as un-
3024 Stat. at L. 379, sec. 9.
3124 Stat. at L. 379, sec. 22. This section was amended in regard to
other matters involved, February 8, 1895, 28 Stat. at L. 643: March 2,
1889, 25 Stat. at L. 855; and August 18, 1922. 42 Stat. at L. 827.32Texas & P. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., (1907) 204 U. S. 426,
27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553.
33Ibid.
Robinson v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.. (1912) 222 U. S. 506, 32
S. C. R. 1114. 56 L. Ed. 288.
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reasonable or unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary
resort to the commission. Sometimes this is required because the
function being exercised is in its nature administrative rather
than judicial. But ordinarily the determining factor is not the
character of the function, but rather the character of the con-
troverted question and the nature of the inquiry necessary for
its solution. To determine whether a shipper has in the past been
wronged by the exaction of an unreasonable or discriminatory
rate is a judicial function, but even though the function is judicial,
preliminary resort to the commission is required. The reason is
that the inquiry is essentially one of fact, and of discretion in
technical matters; also because uniformity can be secured only
if its determination is left the commission. Furthermore, the
determination as to whether there has been discrimination for or
against certain shippers or unreasonable charges, is reached
ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the ade-
quate appreciation of which acquaintance with many intricate
facts of transportation is indispensable, and such acquaintance
is commonly to be found only in a body of experts."
Likewise, the question whether an undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any locality, forbidden by the act,
arose from the operation of an intrastate rate as compared with
an interstate rate, or whether any locality was thereby subjected
to an undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage, is prima-
rily for the investigation and determination of the commission, and
not for the courts.3 5 The same rule applies as to whether a rate
established by a state commission creates undue discrimination
against interstate or foreign rates or commerce."
The decisions of the courts also show that in cases involving
alleged discrimination, or alleged unreasonable rates, practices,
or charges, the question whether the acts of a carrier are such as
to constitute compliance or noncompliance with the provisions of
the interstate commerce act, is an administrative one primarily
for the commission to decide.37 Thus maintenance of a suit to
34Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922) 259 U. S.
285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.
35Simpson v. Shepard, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57
L. Ed. 1511.36Illinois C. R. Co. v. Railroad Co. of Ky., (D.C. Ky. 1924) 1 Fed.(2d) 805; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Tramwell, (D.C. Ga..1923) 287
Fed. 741.
37Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (1912) 225 U. S. 282, 32 Sup.
Ct. 761, 56 L. Ed. 1091; Un:ted States v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1913)
231 U. S. 274, 34 Sup. Ct. 75. 58 L. Ed. 218; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L Ed. 309; Great
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recover damages from a carrier because of the collection of an
unreasonable rate depends on prior action by the commission.
This is on the ground that since the reasonableness of rates is an
administrative question, it will not be considered by the court
in the first instance.3' Furthermore, a proposed change in a
carrier's tariffs, for canceling the published classification and rates
on a commodity and including it among articles that would not
be accepted for shipment, constitutes an alteration in classification
or regulations affecting classifications and as such the commission
has exclusive initial jurisdiction to suspend or annul such pro-
posed change.4"
The courts frequently call attention to the fact that the prob-
lems of rates and rate-making are peculiarly administrative in
character and are for the commission and not for the courts to
pass upon. The commission has exclusive original jurisdiction to
determine whether a regulation or a practice affecting rates or
matters sought to be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Act
is unjust or unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory, preferential.
or prejudicial, even though the regulation or practice complained
of has ceased. Also permissible discrimination based upon differ-
ence in conditions is primarily a question for the commission.
4
"
The preservation of uniformity, the prevention of discrimi-
nation, and the varying and sometimes conflicting results that
might be taken by different tribunals, renders it not only expedi-
ent but also necessary that there should be one body with special
administrative qualifications to pass upon questions of facts,
especially those of an administrative nature, insofar as they relate
Northern R. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 285 42 Sup.
Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943; Edward Hines, Y. P. T. v. United States. (1923)
263 U. S. 143, 44 Sup. Ct. 72, 68 L. Ed. 216; Nashville, C. & St. L. R.
v. Tennessee, (1923) 262 U. S. 318, 43 Sup. Ct. 583, 67 L. Ed. 999;
Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Solum, (1918) 247 U. S. 477, 38 Sup. Ct.
550, 62 L. Ed. 1221; United States v. Pacific & A. R. & N. Co., (1913) 228
U. S. 87, 33 Sup. Ct. 443, 57 L. Ed. 74338Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Merriam & M. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1924)
297 Fed. 1, Certiorari denied, Merriam & M. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co..
(1924) 265 U. S. 592, 44 Sup. Ct. 637, 68 L. Ed. 1196.39Terminal R. Assn. v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 17, 69 L. Ed.
150, Sup. Ct. 5; Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 156.
43 Sup. Ct. 47, 67 L. Ed. 183; Manufacturers' R. Co. v. United States,
(1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; Fulton Bay &
C. M. v. American R. Express Co., (1923) 288 Fed. 854; Czizek v. Western
U. T. Co., (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1921) 272 Fed. 223.
40Director General of R. v. Viscose Co., (1921) 254 U. S. 498, 41
Sup. Ct. 151, 65 L. Ed. 372.
4lMitchell C. & C. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 247
35 Sup. Ct. 917, 57 L. Ed. 1472.
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to the enforcing of the Interstate Commerce Act. Under the
statute there are many acts of the carriers which are lawful or
unlawful according as they are reasonable or unreasonable. The
determination of such questions frequently involves a comparison
of rates with service, or one rate with another. Such questions
call for the exercise of the discretion of the commission, which is
essentially an administrative body.
4
2
(c) Recovery of Damages.
(1) In Case of Rebates
In an action to recover damages sustained by a shipper resulting
from rebates, previous action by the commission is not necessary
where there is no question of an administrative nature as to what
constitutes rebate.43 If questions arise, however, as to whether the
act complained of involves such discrimination or unreasonable
allowances as amounts to rebates, those are questions which must
first be passed upon by the commission.-" On this point the Su-
preme Court said:
"For doing an act prohibited by the statute, the injured part)
might sue the carrier without previous action by the commission,
because the courts could apply the lav prohibiting a departure
from the tariff to the facts of the case. But where the suit is
based upon unreasonable charges or unreasonable practices, there
is no law fixing what is unreasonable and therefore prohibited.
In such cases the whole scope of the statute shows that it was
intended that the commission, and not the courts, should pass upon
that administrative question. When such order is made, it is as
though the law for that particular practice had been fixed, and
4
-
2Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, (1914) 232 U. S. 199,
34 Sup. Ct. 291, 58 L. Ed. 568; Manufacturers' R. Co. v. United States,
(1918) 246 U. S. 457, 38 Sup. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; Hooker Y. Knapp.
(1912) 225 U. S. 302, 32 Sup. Ct. 769, 56 L Ed. 1099. In the following
cases, jurisdiction of the court was sustained without preliminary resort
to the commission, on the ground that no question was involved for
administrative discretion, and because the issues involved were questions
of law; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. F. W. Cook B. Co.. (1912) 223 U. S.
70, 32 Sup. Ct. 189, 56 L. Ed. 355; Eastern R. Co. v. Littlefield, (1915)
237 U. S. 140, 35 Sup. Ct. 489, 59 L. Ed. 878; Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Kittaning I. & S. Mfg. Co., (1920) 253 U. S. 319, 40 Sup. Ct. 532, 64 L.
Ed. 928; Hite v. Central R. of N. J., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1909) 171 Fed. 370,
96 C. C. A. 326; Gimbel Bros. v. Barrett, (D.C. Pa. 1914) 215 Fed. 1004,
(D.C. Pa. 1914) 218 Fed. 880; Barrett v. Gimbel Bros., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir.
1915) 226 Fed. 623, 141 C.C.A. 379; National Elevator Co. v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. R. Co., (C.A.A. 8th Ci.r 1917) 246 Fed. 588, 158 C. C. A- 558.
43Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International C. M. Co., (1913) 230 U. S.
184, 33 Sup. Ct. 893, 57 L. Ed. 1446; Dusenberry v. Lehigh Valley R.
Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 1009.
44Mitchell C. & C. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 247,
35 Sup. Ct. 917, 57 L. Ed. 1472.
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the courts could then apply that order not to one case, but to
every case,-thereby giving every shipper equal rights and pre-
serving uniformity of practice... "
As to the right of the plaintiff to decide upon his remedy un-
der section nine of the Act in cases involving unreasonable rates
or practices, the court said:
"Section nine gives the plaintiff the option of going before
the commission or the courts for damages occasioned by a vio-
lation of the statute. But since the commission is charged with
the duty of determining whether the practice was so unreasonable
as to be a violation of the law, the plaintiff must, as a condition
to his right to succeed, produce an order from the commission
that the practice or the rate was thus unreasonable, and therefore
illegal and prohibited.
' 45
(2) Unlawful Distribution of Cars
In order to recover damages sustained by an alleged unlawful
distribution of cars, due to unreasonable preference and unjust
discrimination, the questions involved as to whether the act com-
plained of amounted to a yiolation, must be decided by the com-
mission. 46  But if the carrier has failed to furnish cars to which
a party is entitled under the carrier's own rule of allotment, pro-
ceedings can start either in a state or federal court since there is
no administrative question involved as long as the carrier's rule
itself in such a case is not attacked.41  On the other hand where
the rule or the method of the carrier in distributing cars is at-
tacked, no action can be had in any court to recover damages
alleged to have been inflicted thereby until the commission has
made its finding as to the reasonableness of the rule.48  The same
principle holds regarding alleged discriminatory practices by car-
4rIbid.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. C. & C. Co., (D.C. N.Y.
1923) 297 Fed. 249.
46Morrisdale C. C. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (1913) 230 U. S. 304, 33
Sup. Ct. 938, 57 L. Ed. 1494.
47Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan C. M. Co., (1915) 237 U. S. 121,
35 Sup. Ct. 484, 59 L. Ed. 867; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hills C.
Co. (1915) 238 U. S. 275, 35 Sup. Ct. 760, 59 L. Ed. 1306; Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. Sonman S. C. Co., (1916) 242 U. S. 120, 37 Sup. Ct. 46. 61
L. Ed. 188; Dusenberry v. Lehigh R. C.. (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 268 Fed. 1009;
Hines v. Henaghan, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1920) 265 Fed. 831; Hines v. Atlantic
Refining Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1920) 265 Fed. 839.
48Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Clark Bros. C. M. Co.. (1915) 238 U. S. 456,
35 Sup. Ct. 896, 59 L. Ed. 1406; Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tie &
T Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138, 34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255; Loomis v.
Lehigh Valley R' Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 43, 36 Sup. Ct. 228, 60 L. Ed. 517.
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riers in the giving or refusing of joint traffic arrangements con-
trary to the Act.49
Also under the Act as amended in 1889" allowing mandamus
to compel the furnishing of cars and other facilities for transpor-
tation, the Supreme Court held, in an action asking for manda-
mus to redress grievances produced by regulations of a railway
company for the distribution of coal cars in times of car shortage,
that such grievances cannot be redressed in advance of action be-
fore the commission. The court further held that the provision of
the Act allowing mandamus must be limited either to the per-
formance of duties which are so plain and so independent of pre-
vious administrative action of the commission as not to require a
prerequisite exertion of power by that body, -or that the provision
of the Act allowing mandamus must be limited to compelling the
performance of duties which plainly arise from the obligatory
force which the statute attaches to the orders of the commission."
(3) Inadequate Equipment or Facilities
In cases where the carrier refuses or neglects to furnish the
necessary equipment and facilities for the convenience of trans-
portation, such as refusing to equip cars with grain doors or trans-
verse bulkhead, which makes it necessary for the shipper to fur-
nish same, the question generally arises as to what character of
equipment and what amount should be deemed reasonable and
adequate. To determine this inquiry the Supreme Court has held
that preliminary resort to the commission is necessary. This is
on the ground that adequate consideration of such problems re-
quires acquaintance with many intricate facts of transportation.
In order to determine such controversies properly, it is neces-
sary to understand the nature and the reasonableness of the de-
mands that are made upon the carrier and to know what the law
and the rules of the commission require from it. Furthermore,
in case of failure on the part of the carrier to furnish what is
required, the question arises as to what allowances should be made
to the shipper for instrumentalities supplied and for services
rendered. These questions have to do largely with administrative
49United States v. Pacific & A. R. & N. Co., (1913) 228 U. S. 87. 33
Sup. Ct. 443, 57 L. Ed. 743.5OAct of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. at L. 862.
5'Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn C. Co..
(1910) 215 U. S. 481, 30 Sup. Ct. 164, 54 L. Ed. 292. See also United
States ex rel. Knapp v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., (1905) 197 U. S. 536,
25 Sup. Ct. 538, 49 L. Ed. 870.
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detail, and are administrative in their character, and as such must
be passed upon by the commission in the first instance 2
(d) Construction of Tariffs. Where there is some doubt
about the construction of a tariff with respect to a rate problem,
the courts will not pass on it. but will refer the matter to the com-
mission. 3 But if there is no real ambiguity as to the terms used
the courts will act and constru the tariff in conformity to the or-
dinary meaning of the terms used.54 The reason for this is that
what construction shall be given to a railroad tariff presents ordi-
narily a question of law which does not differ in character from
those presented when the construction of any other document is
in dispute. That is, when the words of a written instrument are
used in their ordinary meaning, their construction presents ques-
tions of law. But words are used sometimes in a peculiar way.
in which extrinsic evidence may be necessary to letermine the
meaning of words appearing in the document. This is true where
technical words or phrases not commonly understood are em-
ployed.
In like manner extrinsic evidence may be necessary to estab-
lish a usage of trade or locality which attaches provisions not ex-
pressed in the language of the instrument. Where such a situa-
tion arises and the peculiar use of words or the existence of a
usage is proved by evidence, the function of construction, at least
to the extent of passing upon words used in a special sense, be-
comes, in the case where the construction of a tariff is involved,
an administrative question for the commission." That is, where
the document to be construed is a tariff of an interstate carrier
.and before it can be construed it is necessary to determine upon
evidence the peculiar usage of words or the existence of inci-
dents alleged to be attached by usage to the transaction, such pre-
liminary determination of the meaning of the terms used must be
made by the commission, and not until this determination has been
made can a court take jurisdiction of the controversy. "
52Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.. (1916) 240 U. S. 43, 36 Sup.
Ct. 228, 60 L. Ed. 517.53Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tic & T. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138.
34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255, and cases cited therein; Davis v. Age-
Herald Pub. Co.. (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 591.54St. Louis. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. J. F. Hasty & Sons, (1921) 255 U. S.
252, 41 Sup. Ct. 269, 65 L. Ed. 614; Great Northern R. Co. v. Merchants
Elevator Co., (1922) 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943.55Texas & P. R. Co. v. Am. Tie & T. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138, 34
Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255.
56Ibid.
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The style and form of documents filed with the commission
setting forth demurrage charges and tariffs are for the commis-
sion to pass upon and not for the courts, 7 as is also the question
as to whether a certain commodity is embraced within a railway's
filed tariff fixing joint through rates.s It is also for the com-
mission to decide whether words in a tariff are used in their
ordinary or in a peculiar or technical sense. This was the situa-
tion in the Amwrican T. & T. Co. Casc. 9 The question really
in issue was whether or not the word lumber which was made use
of in the tariff, had been used in a peculiar sense. The court held
that the question was an administrative one and as such prelimi-
nary resort must be had to the commission.
In summing up the rule as to whose function it is to construe
a statute or a tariff, it may be stated that the construction and
interpretation of law is generally for the courts. At least such
a question is as a rule ultimately for the courts. But where the
words used have a special or a technical meaning or are used in
such a way as to lead to ambiguity, or to be subject to a different
meaning because of usage, then the proper meaning of such
terms, when used in connection with matters within the jurisdic-
tion of the interstate commerce commission, presents an adminis-
trative question for the interstate commerce commission to pass
upon. The courts in such a case will not act until there has been
a decision by the commission. This is especially true where the
problems involved have to do with discrimination or the reason-
ableness or unreasonableness of rates, practices, or charges, since
these questions are peculiarly and more completely within the
jurisdiction of the commission than most of the other problems
with -which the commission is concerned.
(e) Bills of Lading. Concerning bills of lading, the judiciary
frequently construes these without previous action by the com-
mission. The courts pass on all limitations contained in the bills
of,lading with respect to the time of bringing suit and with respect
57Berwind-White C. M. Co. v. Chicago & E. R. Co., (1914) 235 U. S.
371, 35 Sup. Ct. 131, 59 L. Ed. 275.58Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tic & T. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138.
34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L. Ed. 1255; see, however, J. C. Francesconi & Co. v.
Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1921) 274 Fed. 687, where a federal
district court held that even though all questions as to rates of an inter-
state carrier must be presented to the commission in the first instance, be-
fore recourse is had to the courts, yet the courts can determine whether
the tariff rules of the carrier on file apply to the situation in the con-
troversy, though such determination involves a construction of the rule.59Texas & P. R. Co. v. American Tie & T. Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 138,
34 Sup. Ct. 885, 58 L Ed. 1255.
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to notice of loss in regard to claims." It is not clear, however,
whether the courts decide it on the question of reasonableness.
which is primarily a question for the commission, or merely hold
it valid because it is in the tariff, subject only to change by per-
mission of the commission.
One federal court held that a ruling of the commission-to
the effect that a provision in the bill of lading requiring suit to
be filed within two years from the time the cause of action arose
was unreasonable and that meritorious claims could be paid not-
withstanding said clause-did not require the court to hold that
the provision was unlawful. The court further held that the rul-
ing of the commission at best operated only for the future.01
Another federal court held that a provision in a bill of lading,
expressly adopted by the commission for good reasons and to the
effect that the value of an article lost should be computed at the
time and place of shipment, was illegal and that the common
law duty should be enforced. That is, according to the decision
of the court, the commission did not have the power, at the time
when the case was decided, to alter the old rule that the loss
should be determined or computed at the point of destination."'
These cases show to some extent the willingness on the part
of the courts to take jurisdiction in cases where the construction
of a bill of lading is involved, whether or not there has been any
action in the case by the commission.
(f) Some Cases in which the Courts will Act without previous
Action by the Commission. The interstate commerce act as
amended by the transportation act of 1920 provides that no in-
terstate carrier shall undertake an extension of its line of railroad
without first obtaining from the commission a certificate authoriz-
ing it, and that the violation of this provision may be enjoined by
the courts.
Under this provision it has been held that the courts have
jurisdiction to determine in the first instance whether or not the
proposed construction is an extension or an industrial track.1
3
Also the collection by a carrier of a rate in excess of the rate
6 0Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Reiss, (1902) 183 U. S. 621, 22 Sup. Ct. 253,
46 L. Ed. 358; Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Carl, (1913) 227 U. S. 639. 33
Sup. Ct. 391, 57 L. Ed. 683; Southern R. Co. v. Prescott, (1916) 240 U. S.
632, 36 Sup. Ct. 469, 60 L. Ed. 836: Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Harold,
(1916) 241 U. S. 371, 36 Sup. Ct. 665, 60 L. Ed. 1050.
OlLehigh, Ellis & Co. v. Payne, (D.C. Ga. 1921) 274 Fed. 443.62McCaull Dinsmore Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., (D.C. Minn.
1918) 252 Fed. 644.63Lancaster v. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co., (D.C. Tex. 1924) 298 Fed. 488.
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charged by it for a longer haul over the same route, without per-
mission of the commission, has been held to be a collection of an
illegal rate and the excess of such rate over the rate for the longer
haul may be recovered by an action in court without resorting
first to the commission. 64  Likewise, the power given the com-
mission to determine rates does not deprive a federal court of
equity of jurisdiction to enjoin the putting into effect of an inter-
state rate which is shown to be unreasonable and in restraint of
interstate commerce, until such a rate can be passed upon by the
commission. This is especially true where an injunction is neces-
sary to prevent irreparable injury. 5
VI. ATTITUDE OF THE COURTS TOWARD THE DECISIONS OF THE
INTERSTATE COMIERCE COMMISSION DURING THE FIRST
YEARS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE CO'MMISSION
In proceeding to the subject of judicial review of cases after
there has been a decision by the interstate commerce commission,
and thus in considering the extent to which the courts will re-
view the decision of the commission, it is necessary to bear in
mind at the outset two things. First, it must be remembered that
the question of conclusiveness of the findings of the commission
has undergone a change since the original act to regulate com-
merce was passed. This change is due chiefly to the amendments
to the act and partly to the changing attitude of the courts. In
the second place, it should be noted that whether or not a finding
is conclusive may depend upon the nature of the question in-
volved, that is, upon the subject matter at issue. Thus, for in-
stance, the decision by the commission regarding rates has more
weight with the courts today than one involving reparation. 6
The Interstate Commerce Act as originally passed 7 and as
amended March 2, 1889,68 provided that-
"Whenever any common carrier, as defined in and subject to
the provisions of this act, shall violate or refuse or neglect to
obey any lawful order or requirement of the commission in this
64Davis v. Parrington, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1922) 281 Fed. 10.
6 5 Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., (1910) 215 U. S. 501.
30 Sup. Ct. 184, 54 L. Ed. 300; see also I. C. C. v. Chicago, G. W. R. Co..
(1908) 209 U. S. 108, 28 Sup. Ct. 493, 52 L. Ed. 705, where an original
action was allowed in court.6rThis is due to the fact that the interstate commerce act at present
expressly provides that the findings of the commission shall be prima facie
evidence in reparation cases.67Act of February 4, 1887. 24 Stat. at L. 384. sec. 16.
6825 Stat. at-L. 859, sec. 5.
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act named, it shall be the duty of the commission, and lawful
for any company or person interested in such order or require-
ment to apply in a summary way, by petition, to the circuit court
of the United States .. . and on such hearing the report of said
commission shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein
stated."
This provision made the findings of the commission, in all
cases properly considered by it, only prima facie evidence in the
courts and the tendency of the courts, during the first years tin-
der the act, was to give the findings only such weight as was
generally given to such evidence. This entitled the courts to ad-
mit additional evidence and if necessary to overrule or set aside
the findings of the commission. The early attitude of the courts
is quite readily seen by examining a few cases before the Suprene
Court of the United States.
In the case of Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Interstate Cononerce
Commission"9 the important question involved was whether cer-
tain rates were reasonable. The Supreme Court held that since
the question was one of fact, peculiarly within the province of
the commission, and since there was nothing in the record mak-
ing it a duty to draw a different conclusion, the decision of the
circuit court of appeals which approved the findings of the com-
mission should be affirmed.
Although the findings of the commission in this case were
finally approved, the case shows that the circuit court could admit
additional evidence, and that there was power both in the circuit
court and in the circuit court of appeals to consider and apply
such additional evidence. This case further shows that the Su-
preme Court at that time could review their decisions where such
additional evidence was involved.
The case of Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Corn-
mnission7 0 also involved the reasonableness of rates. The Supreme
Court called attention to the fact that the judiciary is "not con-
cluded by the findings or conclusions of the commission." It was
held in this case, however, that in order that a court may set aside
the findings of the commission it is necessary that the important
issue involved is before the court and that it has the necessary
evidence before it upon which to base its decision.
The question as to the reasonableness of long and short haul
rates was involved in Interstate Commerce Coimnission v'. Ala-
69(1896) 162 U. S. 184, 16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40 L. Ed. 935.
70(1896) 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940.
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bamna.7 It was contended that the court had no jurisdiction to
review the judgment of the commission upon a question of fact;
that the court was only authorized to inquire whether or not the
commission had misconstrued the statute and had thereby ex-
ceeded its power. It was also contended that there was no gen-
eral jurisdiction to take evidence upon the merits of the original
controversy. These contentions were overruled by the Supreme
Court which stated that-
"Vie think this contention is sufficiently answered by simply
referring to those portions of the act which provide that, when
the court is invoked by the commission to enforce its lawful orders
or requirements, the court shall proceed, as a court of equity, to
hear and determine the matter, and in such manner as to do jus-
tice in the premises."
The court further said that it was competent for the circuit
court in dealing with the issues raised by the petition of the com-
mission and the answers thereto, and for the circuit court of ap-
peals on appeal, to determine the case upon a consideration of the
allegations of the parties, and of the evidence adduced in their
support. It was further stated that in so doing the courts should
give effect to the findings of fact in the report of the commission
as prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated.
The court affirmed the practice adhered to in the Cincinnati
Ry. Case" in allowing additional evidence to be taken by the
court, and held that the courts are not restricted to the evidence
adduced before the commission, nor to a consideration merely of
the power of the commission to make the particular order under
question, but that additional evidence may be put in by either
party and that the duty of the court is to decide as a court of
equity, upon the entire body of evidence.
The Supreme Court, however, even in these early cases stressed
the importance of having questions of fact considered by the
commission in the first instance, and in cases where the commis-
sion erred in the findings of fact the case should generally be re-
manded to the commission.
"1(1897) 164 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. 45, 42 L. Ed. 414. In this case
the board of trade in Troy, Alabama filed a complaint before the interstate
comerce commission claiming that the defendant carriers, in the rates
charged for transportation of property, discriminated against the town
of Troy, in violation of the terms and provisions of the act of 1887.
72Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1896) 162 U. S. 184.
16 Sup. Ct. 700, 40"L. Ed. 935. In this case the court said: "We do not
mean, of course, that either party, in a trial in the court, is to be restricted
to the evidence that was before the commission. but that the purposes
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In the Texas Ry. Case-- the court said:
"If the circuit court of appeals were of opinion that the com-
mission, in making its order, had misconceived the extent of its
powers, and if the circuit court had erred in affirming the validity
of an order made under such misconception, the duty of the cir-
cuit court of appeals was to reverse the decree, set aside the or-
der, and remand the cause to the commission, in order that it
might, if it saw fit, proceed therein according to law... "
As to the importance of having certain questions considered
by the commission, the court said:
"The defendant was entitled to have its defense considered,
in the first instance, at least, by the commission, upon a full con-
sideration of all the circumstances and conditions upon which a
legitimate order could be founded."
As to the nature of questions that should be considered by the
commission, the court said:
"The questions whether certain charges were reasonable or
otherwise, whether certain discriminations were due or undue,
were questions of fact, to be passed upon by the commission in
the light of all facts duly alleged and supported by competent
evidence, and it did not comport with the true scheme of the
statute that the circuit court of appeals should undertake, of its
own motion, to find and pass upon such questions of fact, in a
case in the position in which the present one was."
The Supreme Court further stated in this case:
"We do not, of course, mean to imply that the commission
may not directly institute proceedings in a circuit court of the
United States charging a common carrier with disregard of pro-
visions of the act, and that thus it may become the duty of the
court to try the case in the first instance. Nor can it be denied that,
even when a petition is filed by the commission for the purpose
of enforcing an order of its own, the court is authorized to 'hear
and determine the matter as a court of equity.' which necessarily
implies that the court is not concluded by the findings or con-
clusions of the commission; yet, as the act provides that on such
hearing the findings of fact in the report of said commission shall
be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated, we think
it plain that if, in such a case the commission has failed, in its
proceedings, to give notice to the alleged offender, or has unduly
restricted its inquiries, upon a mistaken view of the law, the
court ought not to accept the findings of the commission as a
legal basis for its own action, but should either inquire into the
of the act call for a full inquiry by the commission into all the circum-
stances and conditions pertinent to the question involved."73Texas & P. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666,
40 L. Ed. 940. See page 410 supra.
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facts on its own account, or send the case back to the commission
to be lawfully proceeded in."'-,
There is an apparent inconsistency in the two statements by
the court in that the first in italics implies that questions of fact
should not be considered by the courts in the first instance, where-
as the second suggests that when the commission has failed to
pass on questions of fact, the court should either inquire into the
facts on its own account or send the case back to the commission.
The apparent inconsistency in the two statements is cleared up,
however, in the following paragraph of the opinion which shows
that the circuit court of appeals should not have inquired into the
facts of its own accord in this case, although it is permissible for
the courts to do so in certain cases.7" Here the question in-
volved was as to the reasonableness of rates, a question especially
for the interstate commerce commission.
One of the outstanding purposes of the creation of the
commission was that there might be established a body of experts
to pass upon the reasonableness of rates, practices, and charges.
Furthermore, the earlier cases were more lenient in allowing the
courts to pass upon both questions of fact and law when the case
had once been before the commission and the commission had
failed to pass upon all necessary questions of fact, than where
the case had never been before the commission. Finally, in the
early cases, when the courts were allowed to pass on questions of
fact, it was generally implied that there must be some reason why
such questions should be considered by the courts, such as numer-
ous or urgent complaints against the existing rates, or otherwise,
the necessity of an immediate decision.7
In the later cases, decided shortly before the Interstate Com-
merce Act was amended in 1906,7 7 the courts seem to give greater
weight to the findings of the commission. The courts seem to
have become more reluctant in going into questions of fact in the
74The italics in the above paragraphs are ours.
'
5The first statement by the Supreme Court refers to the jurisdiction
of the circuit courts of appeals which are exclusively appellate courts,
whereas the second statement refers to the power of the circuit courts.
'
6Texas & P. R. Co. v. I. C. C., (1896) 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. 666.
40 L. Ed. 940. On these points the Supreme Court said: "The mere fact
that the disparity between the through and the local rates %was considerable
did not, of itself, warrant the court in finding that such disparity constitu-
ted an undue discrimination. Much less did it justify the court in finding
that the entire difference between the two rates was undue or unreasonable.
especially as there was no person, firm, or corporation complaining that
he or they had been aggrieved by such disparity."
'
TSee text and footnote 81 of the next installment.
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first instance, or in entering into an independent investigation of
the facts, and have become more insistent that in case the com-
mission erred in finding facts, the case should be remanded to it.
Thus in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. BehlmerT the com-
mission's findings of fact were held to be prima facie correct.
In Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. v. Interstate Cosnmerce Conmmission'M
the Supreme Court states that in view of the fact that the statute
gives prima facie effect to the findings of the commission, such
findings, when concurred in by a federal court, should not be
interfered with unless the record established that clear and un-
mistakable error had been committed.
The opinions and decisions of the federal courts also show
that during the latter part of the period prior to the amending
of the act in 1906, the courts gave more consideration to the
statement in the act that the findings and reports of the commis-
sion should be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stat-
ed; and held that under this provision the findings of the con-
mission should not be set aside unless there were urgent reasons
for so doing. Furthermore, as the cases before the commission
and before the courts under the interstate commerce act became
more numerous, the courts realized more and more the expediency
of having the commission first pass upon intricate questions of
fact, the duty of which was imposed upon it by statute and for
which it was considered peculiarly competent.8 0
(To be concluded.)
78(1900) 175 U. S. 648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. Ed. 309.
,9(1907) 206 U. S. 142, 27 Sup. Ct. 648, 51 L. Ed. 995: to the same
effect see Illinois C. R. Co. v. I. C. C.. (1907) 206 U. S. 441. 27 Sup. Ct.
700, 51 L. Ed. 1129.80Texas & P R. Co. v. Abilene C. 0. Co.. (1907) 204 U. S. 426,
27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553; East Tennessee V. & G. R. Co. v. 1. C. C.,(1901) 181 U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 516, 45 L. Ed. 719; I. C. C. v. Chicago
B. & Q. R. Co., (1902) 186 U. S. 320, 22 Sup. Ct. 824,:46 L. Ed. 1182;
Cincinnati. H. & D. R. Co., v. I. C. C., (1907) 206 U. S. 142, 27 Sup. Ct.
648, 51 L. Ed. 995; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Behlmer, (1900) 175 U. S.
648, 20 Sup. Ct. 209, 44 L. Ed. 309: Southern R. Co. v. Tilt, (1907) 206
U. S. 428, 27 Sup. Ct. 709, 51 L. Ed. 1124; Illinois C. R. Co. v. I. C. C.,(1907) 206 U. S. 441, 27 Sup. Ct. 700, 51 L. Ed. 1129. See also I. C. C.
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., (1910) 218 U. S. 88, 30 Sup. Ct. 651. 54
L. Ed. 946; and I. C. C. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., (1910) 218 U. S.
113, 30 Sup. Ct. 660, 54 L. Ed. 959.
